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 Use of nuclear weapons and protection of the 
environment during international armed conl ict 
 Erik V.   Koppe  
 Introduction 
 Nuclear weapons are potentially the most destructive weapons ever invented. 
 h e almost unimaginable impact of the use of nuclear weapons, including on 
the environment, was recognised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons 1 (hereat er, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion). As the ICJ recognised, 
their characteristics render nuclear weapons:
 potentially catastrophic. h e destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot 
be contained in either space or time. h ey have the potential to destroy all 
civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. h e radiation release 
by a nuclear explosion would af ect health, agriculture, natural resources 
and demography over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons 
would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the 
potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, 
and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations. 2 
 In the case of a use of nuclear weapons, however, the Court’s discussion of the 
relevant rules of public international law governing the protection of the envir-
onment is rather general. h e Court stated in this regard: 
 States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing 
what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military 
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to 
assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity 
and proportionality … 
 h e Court thus i nds that while the existing international law relating to 
the protection and safeguarding of the environment does not specii cally 
 1  ICJ,  Legality of the h reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 
35 (hereat er, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion). For more information on the charac-
teristics of nuclear weapons and the ef ects of nuclear explosions, see  E. V.  Koppe ,  h e Use of 
Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment during International Armed Conl ict 
( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2008) , pp. 47–105. 
 2  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 35. 
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prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmen-
tal factors that are properly to be taken into account in the context of the 
implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in armed 
conl ict. 3 
 In view of the environmental consequences of the use of any nuclear weapon, 
the general concern for the environment during armed conl ict since 1972, 4 
and the development of specii c rules of public international law in this area, 
the ICJ’s analysis might appear rather unambitious. Further, it is surprising that 
the Court chose to discuss rules protecting the environment during armed con-
l ict separately from its assessment of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons 
under ‘the law applicable in armed conl ict, in particular humanitarian law’ 
(para. 36). 
 In view of recent developments relating to the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons 5 and renewed interest in the law governing the protection of the envir-
onment in relation to armed conl ict, 6 further clarii cation of the applicable 
law is warranted. h is chapter seeks to clarify the scope of the relevant rules 
of the law of armed conl ict and to assess,  in abstracto , the legality of use of 
nuclear weapons under these rules. 7 It i rst describes relevant rules of treaty law 
 3  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paras. 30, 33. 
 4  Principle 26 of the Stockholm Declaration provides: ‘Man  and his environment must be 
spared the ef ects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction’ (emphasis 
added) (UN doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1). See also para. 5 of the 1982 World Charter for 
Nature (A/Res/37/7), Principle 24 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (UN doc. A/CONF.151/26/
Rev.l (Vol. I), and A/Res/47/37 (protection of the environment during armed conl ict) in 
this context. 
 5  See the International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 
hosted by Norway in Oslo on 4–5 March 2013, available at:  www.humimpact2013.no , and 
Resolution 1 of the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, Geneva, 26 November 2011, which focuses on the elimination of nuclear weap-
ons. See also President Obama’s announcement in Berlin on 19 June 2013 that he would seek 
a further reduction of deployed nuclear weapons from the level established with Russia in the 
New START treaty. See h e White House, Oi  ce of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nuclear 
Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States’, 19 June 2013, available at:  www.white-
house.gov/the-press-oi  ce/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-
united-states . 
 6  In 2011 the International Law Commission (ILC) decided to include the protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conl icts in its long-term programme of work. UN doc. 
A/66/10, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third session (26 April–3 June 
and 4 July–12 August 2011), para. 365. See ILC, ‘Protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conl icts’, last updated 5 June 2013, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_7.htm. 
 7  Protection of the environment during armed conl ict also follows from  jus ad bellum and 
 jus pacis . h e protection of the environment during armed conl ict under  jus ad bellum 
follows from the establishment by the Security Council in 1991 of Iraq’s responsibility for 
all environmental damage resulting from its illegal use of force against Kuwait (Resolution 
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relating to the protection of the environment during international armed con-
l ict (Section A). It then discusses protection of the environment during armed 
conl ict under customary international law (Section B). h e chapter ends with 
a brief conclusion. 
 A.  Protection of the environment under treaty law 
 h e protection of the environment under the law of armed conl ict is spe-
cii cally regulated in four treaties: 8 the 1976 ENMOD Convention, 9 1977 
Additional Protocol I, 10 the 1980 Incendiary Weapons Protocol (Protocol III to 
the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) 11 and the 1998 Rome 
687, para. 16). h e protection of the environment during armed conl ict under  jus pacis 
follows from the continuing applicability of rules of international environmental law in 
the relationship between belligerents and non-belligerents and in the relationship between 
belligerents  inter se . According to the ILC, treaties relating to the international protection 
of the environment are presumed to remain fully operational during armed conl ict due 
to their subject matter. See Article 7 and Annex under (g) of the 2011 Drat  Articles on 
the Ef ects of Armed Conl icts on Treaties (UN doc. A/66/10), which was commended by 
the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 66/98 of 9 December 2011. For a discussion 
of the protection of the environment during armed conl ict under  jus ad bellum and  jus 
pacis , see Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , Chapters 4 and 5. On the relationship and 
overlap between  jus ad bellum and  jus in bello , see  E. V.  Koppe , ‘Compensation for War 
Damages under Jus ad Bellum’ in:  A.  de Guttry ,  H. H. G.  Post and  G.  Venturini (eds.), 
 h e 1998–2000 War between Eritrea and Ethiopia: An International Legal Perspective ( h e 
Hague :  T. M. C. Asser Press ,  2009 ) . 
 8  h e law of neutrality, which is part of the law of armed conl ict and which prescribes the 
inviolability of the territory of neutral states (see Article 1 of 1907 Hague Convention V 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land), 
may have a signii cant impact on protection of the environment during armed conl ict. 
However, the law of neutrality in case of environmental harm may have been ef ectively dis-
placed by the continuing applicability of rules of international environmental law between 
belligerent states and non-belligerent states. For more discussion, including details of state 
practice regarding compensation paid by Allied Powers for damage caused in Switzerland 
by shockwaves from bombing attacks on a German border town during the Second World 
War, see Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 297–308 and 335–64. 
 9  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modii cation Techniques, New York, 10 December 1976, in force 5 October 1978, 1108 
UNTS 151 (No. 17119). 
 10  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conl icts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, 
in force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3 (No. 17512). 
 11  Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Ef ects, Geneva, 10 October 1980, in force 2 December 1983, 1342 UNTS 137 (No. 22495). 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 12 Of these four treat-
ies, only 1977 Additional Protocol I is directly relevant to the present discus-
sion.  ENMOD is not specii cally relevant because its Article I prohibits use 
of environmental modii cation techniques as such, irrespective of any use of 
nuclear weapons . 13 h e 1980  Incendiary Weapons Protocol is not relevant since 
nuclear weapons do not fall within the dei nition of incendiary weapons under 
that Protocol . 14 Lastly, the ICC Statute leads to individual criminal responsi-
bility rather than state responsibility and will therefore not be discussed in any 
detail. 
 1.  Articles 35(3) and 55, 1977 Additional Protocol I 
 Additional Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions was negotiated 
in Geneva between 1974 and 1977 and was intended to reai  rm and develop 
international humanitarian law (IHL). h e Protocol merges the classic conduct 
of hostilities law of h e Hague with the humanitarian law of Geneva, with a 
 12  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, 
2187 UNTS, 90 (No. 38544). 
 13  Even if nuclear weapons were used to manipulate natural processes, for example to cause 
tsunamis or earthquakes as explained in the Convention’s Understanding Relating to Article 
II, it would still be the use of the environmental modii cation technique, and not the use of 
nuclear weapons as such, that would constitute a violation of Art. I of ENMOD. Although 
reference to the use of herbicides in the Final Declaration following the Second Review 
Conference of the states parties to ENMOD in 1992 could be interpreted as broadening 
the scope of ENMOD (‘h e Conference coni rms that the military or any other hostile use 
of herbicides as an environmental modii cation technique in the meaning of Article II is 
a method of warfare prohibited by Article I if such use of herbicides upsets the ecological 
balance of a region, thus causing widespread, long-lasting or severe ef ects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other Party’), the declaration cites the use of herbi-
cides  as an environmental modii cation technique , and thus does not serve as state practice 
to go beyond the text of the Convention. h e ICJ did not discuss the legality of the use of 
nuclear weapons as such under ENMOD, despite views expressed by a number of states on 
this issue (Egypt and Iran argued that the use of nuclear weapons would violate ENMOD; 
the United States and the United Kingdom opposed this view). See further on the possible 
applicability of ENMOD to use of nuclear weapons: Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , 
pp. 130–4, 366. 
 14  See the dei nition in Article 1(1), in which the Protocol dei nes an incendiary weapon as 
‘any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set i re to objects or to cause burn 
injury to persons through the action of l ame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a 
chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target’. Although nuclear weapons have 
signii cant incendiary ef ects (approximately 35 per cent of the explosive energy in the case 
of a i ssion weapon and 38 per cent in the case of fusion weapons), the primary ef ect of a 
nuclear explosion is a shock wave (approximately 50 per cent in the case of a i ssion weapon 
and 54 per cent for a fusion weapon). See Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 69, 73–4. 
Further, the heat of a nuclear explosion is not produced by a chemical reaction and the 
Protocol is annexed to the 1980 Convention on Certain  Conventional Weapons, which 
would  ipso facto render application to nuclear weapons problematic. 
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view to enhancing protection of the victims of armed conl ict. 15 Among the 
Protocol’s 102 Articles, two provisions specii cally govern protection of the 
environment during international armed conl ict: Article 35(3) and Article 
55. 16 Article 35(3) provides that:
 It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended 
or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment. 
 Article 55 provides that:
 1.  Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. h is protection includes a 
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended 
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment 
and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
 2.  Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are 
prohibited. 
 Both provisions aim to protect the natural environment during international 
armed conl ict in the widest possible sense, 17 including the air and marine 
environment, 18 but do so in dif erent ways. Whereas Article 35(3) lays down 
a basic rule on means and methods of warfare and is intended to protect the 
 15  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 75. 
 16  For a discussion of the possible indirect protection of the environment provided by the 
customary and conventional rules relating to the protection of civilian objects, see Koppe, 
 h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 279–97. Although the environment may indeed qualify as 
a civilian object, it is submitted that, on the basis of a contextual interpretation of Art. 55, 
1977 Additional Protocol I, and in light of the legislative history of Arts. 55 and 35(3), pro-
tection of the environment during armed conl ict cannot be derived from Arts. 48, 51 and 
52 of the Protocol. In relation to the prohibition of excessive collateral damage to the envir-
onment and in more detail, see  E. V.  Koppe , ‘ h e principle of ambituity and the prohib-
ition against excessive collateral damage to the environment during armed conl ict ’,  Nordic 
Journal of International Law  82 ( 2013 ),  53–87 , at 68–75. 
 17  C.  Pilloud and  J.  Pictet , ‘Article 55’ in  Y.  Sandoz ,  C.  Swinarski and  B.  Zimmerman (eds.), 
 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 ( Geneva :  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/Martinus Nijhof  
Publishers ,  1987 ) , para. 2126. See also Article II of ENMOD. 
 18  h e scope of Art. 35(3), 1977 Additional Protocol I does not appear to be limited to the 
consequences of land, air or naval warfare for the civilian population on land, as is the case 
for Art. 55 (see Art. 49(3) of the Protocol). Such would follow, among other things, from 
the text of the ICRC’s Drat  Protocol that would form the basis of the negotiations at the 
1974–77 Diplomatic Conference. h e ICRC envisaged the section on basic rules of the law 
of armed conl ict as applying to ‘military operations as a whole carried out within the gen-
eral framework of land, air or sea warfare’.  ICRC ,  Drat  Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary ( Geneva :  ICRC ,  1973) , p.  54 , available at: 
 www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-Drat -additional-protocols.pdf . See Koppe,  h e 
Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 154–67. 
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intrinsic value of the environment, arguably Article 55 aims to protect the 
environment as a civilian object (Article 55 is included in Chapter III of Part 
IV which deals with the protection of the civilian population, including civilian 
objects), in particular because of its importance for the health and survival of 
the civilian population. h e former provision is therefore generally regarded as 
ecocentric while the latter is considered anthropocentric. 19 
 Although states drat ing 1977 Additional Protocol I were concerned for the 
environment in times of international armed conl ict, particularly at er witness-
ing the damage resulting from the war in Vietnam, they did not mean to pro-
hibit ordinary battlei eld damage. Indeed, during the Diplomatic Conference, 
the United Kingdom observed in relation to Article 55 that the provision struck 
the necessary balance, protecting the environment against severe damage ‘while 
not making for instance, a tank commander whose tank l attened a clump of 
trees liable as a war criminal’. 20 Further, a conference report stated that:
 h e time or duration required … was considered by some to be measured 
in decades. References to twenty or thirty years were made by some repre-
sentatives as being a minimum. Others referred to battlei eld destruction in 
France in the First World War as being outside the scope of the prohibition. 
 h e report also observed that:
 it is impossible to say with certainty what period of time might be involved. 
It appeared to be a widely shared assumption that battlei eld damage inci-
dental to conventional warfare would not normally be proscribed by this 
provision. 21 
 For those reasons, it was agreed that only under exceptional circumstances 
would damage to the environment lead to a violation of the law of armed con-
l ict. First, Articles 35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I only prohibit 
use of means and methods that are either intended or expected to cause dam-
age to the environment. Accordingly, each provision prohibits not only deliber-
ate or direct attacks on the environment, but also attacks where it is reasonably 
 19  M. N.  Schmitt , ‘ Green war: an assessment of the environmental law of international armed 
conl ict’ ,  Yale Journal of International Law  22 ( 1997 ),  1–109 , at 70–1. Since Art. 35(3) cannot 
be deduced from fundamental principles of the law of armed conl ict (military necessity, 
distinction, proportionality and humanity), I have argued elsewhere that Art. 35(3) indi-
cates the existence of a new fundamental principle of the law of armed conl ict, namely the 
principle of ambituity. h e word ambituity is derived from the Latin word  ambitus , which 
means environment. h e principle of ambituity would provide for an absolute limitation to 
the necessities of war. See Koppe, ‘h e principle of ambituity’, 56–61. 
 20  H. S.  Levie ,  Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions , 4 vols. 
( Dobbs Ferry:  Oceana Publications ,  1980) , Vol. III, p.  272 . 
 21  Report of Committee III, Second Session (CDDH/215/Rev.1), in Levie,  Protection of War 
Victims , Vol. II, pp. 276–7. 
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forseeable that they will lead to excessive collateral environmental damage. 22 
h is applies irrespective of the weapons used and requires those who deploy 
these means or methods of warfare to know or reasonably predict that the attack 
they will launch will have such detrimental ef ects. h is is an important limiting 
factor since environmental harm is not always directly visible or demonstrable. 
Natural processes are dii  cult to analyse and military commanders may not 
know how certain activities will impact the environment over the long term. 23 
 Second, it was agreed that the use of means and methods of warfare would 
only be prohibited if such means or methods of warfare would lead to ‘wide-
spread, long-term and severe’ damage to the environment. Indeed, contrary 
to the drat ers of the 1976 ENMOD Convention, the drat ers of Articles 35(3) 
and 55 chose to include a cumulative damage threshold: widespread, long-
term  and severe. 24 Since these terms were not dei ned, they must be inter-
preted in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation as rel ected 
in Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). 25 Potentially, however, establishing the ordinary meaning of the terms 
widespread, long-term and severe 26 is a highly subjective exercise. 27 Although 
they indicate a high level of seriousness, 28 arguably they should be interpreted 
 22  Schmitt, ‘Green War’, 72;  M.  Bothe , ‘War and Environment’ in  R.  Bernhardt (ed.), 
 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law. Volume Four: Quirin, Ex Parte to Zones of 
Peace ( Amsterdam :  Elsevier ,  2000) , p.  1344 ;  Y.  Dinstein ,  h e Conduct of Hostilities under 
the Law of International Armed Conl ict , 2nd edn ( Cambridge University Press ,  2010) , 
p.  204 . See also  J.-M.  Henckaerts and  L.  Doswald-Beck (eds.),  Customary International 
Humanitarian Law , 3 vols. ( Cambridge University Press ,  2005) , Vol. II, p.  877 . h is inter-
pretation is supported by declarations made by the UK and France upon ratii cation of 
1977 Additional Protocol I, on 28 January 1998 and 11 April 2001, respectively. Both 
states stated that the risk of environmental damage as a result of the use of means and 
methods of warfare must be assessed ‘objectively on the basis of information available at 
the time’. See  www.icrc.org/ihl . 
 23  W. D.  Verwey , ‘ Protection of the environment in times of armed conl ict: in search of a new 
legal perspective ’,  Leiden Journal of International Law  8 ( 1995 ),  7–40 , at 12. 
 24  Article I of this Convention prohibits the use of environmental modii cation techniques for 
hostile purposes if they cause ‘widespread, long-lasting or severe ef ects’. 
 25  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 
January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331 (No. 18232). 
 26  See, e.g.,  M.  Bothe , ‘ h e protection of the environment in times of armed conl ict: legal rules, 
uncertainty, dei ciencies, and possible developments ’,  German Yearbook of International 
Law  34 ( 1991 )  54–62 , at 56. 
 27  See Justice Stewart’s observation in relation to pornography and the i rst amendment. 
Rather than attempting to dei ne pornography, he stated: ‘I know it when I see it.’ Justice 
Stewart, concurring, in US Supreme Court,  Jacobellis v.  Ohio , 378 US 184 (1964). 
 28  At er the 1990–91 Gulf War, it was doubted whether the damage resulting from the burning 
of oil wells and the oil spillage in the Persian Gulf would have met the damage threshold of 
Arts. 35(3) and 55 if the Protocol had been applicable.  US Department of Defense ,  ‘Report 
to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War – Appendix on the Role of the law of 
War’ ,  International Legal Materials  31 ( 1992 ),  612–44 , at 636–7 . Similarly, the Committee 
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in accordance with current views on environmental damage and current stand-
ards of international environmental law. 29 At er all,  tempora mutantur, nos et 
mutamur in illis : times change and we change with them. 
 2.  Articles 35(3) and 55 and the use of nuclear weapons 
 In view of the importance of Articles 35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol 
I for protection of the environment during international armed conl ict, it is 
important to establish the extent to which each provision would apply in 
the event of any new use of nuclear weapons. Apart from the fact that not all 
acknowledged and unacknowledged nuclear weapon states are parties to the 
Protocol (India, Israel, Pakistan and the United States are not, for instance), it has 
been widely argued that 1977 Additional Protocol I is not, as such, applicable to 
the use of nuclear weapons. h is view was already rel ected in the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s general introductory note to its Drat  
Protocols, which were intended to be the basis for the negotiations in Geneva. In 
this introduction, the ICRC stated that it did not intend to ‘broach’ (i.e. discuss) 
problems relating to atomic, bacteriological and chemical warfare. 30 
 h is author does not i nd that argument particularly persuasive. Since the 
text of the Protocol is of general character and does not refer to any specii c 
weapon or weapon category, it should therefore be presumed to apply to any 
type of weapon. Further, state practice, including by parties to the Protocol, is 
divided on whether the Protocol applies to the use of nuclear weapons. Some 
states are of the opinion that the Protocol, including Article 35(3), applies to all 
established to review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia reported to the Public Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that damage resulting from the 1999 NATO bombing campaign 
did not meet the threshold of either provision.  ICTY, ‘ Final Report to the Prosecutor by 
the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia ’,  International Legal Materials  39 ( 2000 ),  1257–83 , at 1262. 
 29  Compare Art. 31(3)(c), VCLT, which provides that ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ must be taken into account, together with 
the context of a particular treaty. 
 30  ICRC,  Drat  Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary , 
p. 2. In 1956 the ICRC proposed amending the law of armed conl ict to enhance protection 
of the civilian population in armed conl ict. h e drat  included an implied prohibition on 
the use of nuclear weapons (Art. 14). It is believed that reference to use of nuclear weapons 
was the reason why the drat  did not lead anywhere. ICRC Drat  Rules for the Limitation 
of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, 1956, in  D.  Schindler 
and  J.  Toman (eds.),  h e Laws of Armed Conl icts; A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions 
and Other Documents ( Dordrecht :  Martinus Nijhof  ,  1988 ) , pp. 251–7.  C.  Pilloud and  J. 
 Pictet , ‘Part IV, Section I – General protection against the ef ects of hostilities’ in  Y.  Sandoz , 
 C.  Swinarski and  B.  Zimmerman (eds.),  Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ( Geneva :  International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC)/Martinus Nijhof  Publishers ,  1987 ) , para. 1841. 
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 132.229.184.42 on Thu Jul 30 16:52:31 BST 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337435.018
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2015
Environmental protection during armed conflict 255
weapon categories including nuclear weapons. 31 As discussed below, however, 
others hold i rmly that the Protocol, or at least the new rules included therein, 
do not apply to use of nuclear weapons. 32 Although there was no ‘need’ for the 
Court ‘to elaborate on the question of the applicability of Additional Protocol I 
of 1977 to nuclear weapons’, the ICJ observed in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion:
 h e fact that certain types of weapons were not specii cally dealt with by the 
1974–1977 Conference does not permit the drawing of any legal conclu-
sions relating to the substantive issues which the use of such weapons would 
raise. 33 
 A number of states made declarations upon signature and/or ratii cation of 
1977 Additional Protocol I, including nuclear weapon states France and the 
UK. 34 France declared:
 Se r é f é rant au projet de protocole r é dig é par le comit é international de la 
croix rouge qui a constitu é la base des travaux de la conf é rence diploma-
tique de 1974–1977, le gouvernement de la r é publique fran ç aise continue 
de consid é rer que les dispositions du protocole concernent exclusivement 
les armes classiques, et qu’elles ne sauraient ni r é glementer ni interdire le 
recours  à l’arme nucl é aire, ni porter pr é judice aux autres r è gles du droit 
 31  India, for example, made an explicit statement to this ef ect upon the adoption of the 
Protocol by the Diplomatic Conference in 1977. CDDH/SR.39, Annex; VI, 113; Plenary 
Meeting of 25 May 1977, in Levie,  Protection of War Victims , Vol. II, p. 279. Before the 
ICJ, within the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Egypt, Malaysia, the 
Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nauru, Samoa and Solomon Islands stated, for various reasons, 
that the Protocol did apply to the use of nuclear weapons. See, e.g., oral statements (CR) 
of Egypt (CR 95/23, pp. 35–6), Solomon Islands (CR 95/23, p. 60), the Marshall Islands 
(CR 95/23, pp. 34–5) and Samoa (CR 95/31, p. 46); and written statements in relation to 
the request of the UN General Assembly of Mexico (para. 74), and of Nauru and Malaysia 
in relation to the request of the World Health Organization (respectively, pp. 51–2 and 
18–19). Note, however, that the Marshall Islands, Malaysia and Nauru were not parties to 
the Protocol. Nauru acceded to the Protocol only in 2006. 
 32  Before the ICJ, within the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the UK, 
the United States, France, the Russian Federation and the Netherlands each stated that the 
new rules introduced in 1977 Additional Protocol I did not apply to the use of nuclear weap-
ons. See, among other places, oral statements of the UK (CR 95/34, pp. 36–7), the United 
States (CR 95/34, pp. 73–5), France (CR 95/24, p. 23) and Russia (CR 95/29, pp. 44–5), and 
the written statement of the Netherlands in relation to the General Assembly request (para. 
23). Note, however, that the UK and France were not party to 1977 Additional Protocol I 
when they made these statements before the Court, and that the United States is still not 
party to it. 
 33  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 84. 
 34  Further declarations were made by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain. Each state declared its understanding that 1977 Additional Protocol I only applied to 
conventional weapons. Ireland, however, expressed its uncertainty as to the applicability of 
the Protocol to the use of nuclear weapons. Reservations available at  www.icrc.org/ihl . 
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international applicables a d’autres activit é s, n é cessaires  à l’exercice par la 
France de son droit naturel de l é gitime d é fense. 35 
 h e UK declared:
 It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the rules 
introduced by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weapons with-
out prejudice to any other rules of international law applicable to other types 
of weapons. In particular, the rules so introduced do not have any ef ect on 
and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 36 
 h ese declarations could be taken to amount to reservations according to 
Article 2(1)(d) VCLT. Apart from the view that both reservations are based on 
a misunderstanding of the scope of the Protocol, as was explained above, argu-
ably both reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of 1977 
Additional Protocol I. 37 h e object and purpose of a treaty must be established 
by discovering the ‘essence’ of a treaty, which can be derived from the title of a 
treaty, its preamble, a particular article, preparatory works or its general archi-
tecture. 38 h e essence of the law of armed conl ict, including 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, is the alleviation of the calamities of war in general, 39 and the pro-
tection of the victims of armed conl ict in particular. 40 It is clearly contrary to 
 35  ‘Referring to the drat  protocol prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
which was the basis of the work of the 1974–7 Diplomatic Conference, the Government of 
France continues to consider that the provisions of the Protocol concern exclusively con-
ventional weapons, and that they can neither regulate nor prohibit the use of nuclear weap-
ons, nor prejudice other rules of international law applicable to other actions necessary for 
France’s exercise of its inherent right of self defence.’ Unoi  cial translation. 
 36  Available at:  www.icrc.org/ihl . 
 37  See Article 19(c) VCLT. Admittedly, however, no state has yet challenged the legality of the 
reservations as being incompatible with the Protocol. 
 38  A.  Pellet , ‘Article 19: Formulation of reservations’ in  O.  Corten and  P.  Klein (eds.),  h e 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary , 2 vols. ( Oxford University Press , 
 2011 ), vol. I, pp.  447–51 . 
 39  St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, signed on 11 December 1868, in force 11 December 1868, 
reprinted in  American Journal of International Law 1(2), Supplement: Oi  cial Documents, 
1907, p. 95, preamble. According to the drat ers of the St Petersburg Declaration, ‘the only 
legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy’ and that for that purpose it was ‘sui  cient to disable the great-
est possible number of men’. 
 40  h e High Contracting Parties to 1977 Additional Protocol I believed it necessary ‘to 
reai  rm and develop the provisions protecting the victims of armed conl icts and to sup-
plement measures intended to reinforce their application’; and further reai  rmed ‘that the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully 
applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without 
any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conl ict or on the causes 
espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conl ict’. As such, this rel ects the essence or 
global project of Additional Protocol I. 
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the aforementioned objects to exclude the use of the most destructive weapon 
ever invented from the scope of the (new) provisions of the Protocol, includ-
ing its provisions on the protection of the (human) environment. As the Court 
recognised:
 h ese characteristics render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. 
h e destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either 
space or time. h ey have the potential to destroy all civilization and the 
entire ecosystem of the planet. h e radiation released by a nuclear explosion 
would af ect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a 
very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious dan-
ger to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage 
the future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic 
defects and illness in future generations. 41 
 Assuming, however, that Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol would indeed 
apply to a new use of nuclear weapons, it is likely that such use would breach 
both provisions. Although damage resulting from a nuclear explosion will 
depend on a number of factors, such as the type of explosion (sub-surface burst, 
surface burst or air burst), the type of nuclear weapon involved (i ssion/fusion 
weapon, enhanced radiation weapon), the environment where the explosion 
takes place and the weather at the time of, and at er, the explosion, it is none-
theless likely that any nuclear explosion during an armed conl ict would cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, and that such 
damage would be reasonably foreseeable. 42 
 Both blast and heat will cause signii cant damage on the ground in case of an 
air burst, a surface burst or a shallow underground burst, and radioactive con-
tamination resulting from the explosion could cover large areas and last for a 
signii cant period of time. Local fallout generally comes down within 24 hours 
at er the explosion in a cigar-shaped pattern, downwind from ‘Ground Zero’, 
and is most damaging, since it contains between 40 per cent and 70 per cent of 
the total radioactivity, and may be of such intensity that certain areas will be 
severely af ected and even remain uni t for human habitation for decades. 43 
 41  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 35. 
 42  Some authors assert that the drat ers of Arts. 35(3) and 55 did indeed consider non-con-
ventional means and methods of warfare, such as herbicides and chemical weapons, when 
they elaborated the two provisions. See, e.g.,  W. A.  Solf , ‘Article 55: Protection of the Natural 
Environment’ in  M.  Bothe ,  K. J.  Partsch , and  W. A.  Solf ,  New Rules for Victims of Armed 
Conl icts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 ( h e Hague :  Martinus Nijhof  ,  1982) , p.  348 ; and  F.  Kalshoven , ‘ Reai  rmation 
and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conl icts: the 
Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974–1977, Part II ’,  Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law  9 ( 1978 ),  107–38 , at 130. 
 43  In 1998, at er sixteen tests over a time-span of twelve years at Bikini Atoll, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considered the islands still generally unsafe for habita-
tion forty years at er the last test had taken place. h e IAEA’s conclusion was based on the 
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 B.  Protection of the environment during armed conl ict under 
customary international law 
 In addition to Articles 35(3) and 55, the environment is also protected under 
three rules of customary international law: Rules 43, 44 and 45 of the ICRC’s 
2005 Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (CIHL Study). 44 Rule 
43 states: 
 h e general principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural 
environment:
 A.  No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a mili-
tary objective. 
 B.  Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless 
required by imperative military necessity. 
 C.  Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected 
to cause incidental damage to the environment which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated 
is prohibited. 
 Rule 44 states:
 Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the 
protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of 
military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in 
any event to minimise, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scien-
tii c certainty as to the ef ects on the environment of certain military opera-
tions does not absolve a party to the conl ict from taking such precautions. 
 Rule 45 states:
 h e use of methods or means or warfare that are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not 
be used as a weapon. 
assumption that the local population would almost entirely consume locally produced 
food, and since substantial amounts of radioactive elements had entered the food chain 
around Bikini Atoll, this would lead to an annual dose that was considered too high by 
IAEA safety standards.  P.  Stegnar , ‘ Review at Bikini Atoll: assessing radiological conditions 
at Bikini Atoll and the prospects for resettlement ’,  IAEA Bulletin  40 ( 4 ) ( 1998 ),  15–18 , at 
15–17. Part of the Atoll has meanwhile been rehabilitated. See  www.bikiniatoll.com and the 
Marshall Islands Program of the US Department of Energy at  www.eh.doe.gov . Please note, 
however, that dif erent species have dif erent radio-sensitivities, and humans appear to be 
more sensitive to nuclear radiation than birds or trees: generally speaking, ‘the higher the 
species on the evolutionary scale, the greater the sensitivity’.  J.  Rotblat ,  Nuclear Radiation 
in Warfare ( London :  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)/Taylor & 
Francis ,  1981) , pp.  100–2 . See also  A. H.  Westing ,  Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
Environment ( London :  SIPRI/Taylor & Francis ,  1977) , pp.  21–2 . 
 44  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, 
pp. 143–58. 
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 Since it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would ever be used without (impera-
tive) military necessity and highly unlikely that they would be used for the 
sole purpose of causing damage to the natural environment, this section only 
discusses the meaning and scope of Rules 43C and 44. h e i rst sentence of Rule 
45 generally rel ects Articles 35(3) and 55, and indicates that, in the view of the 
ICRC, both provisions have developed into rules of customary international 
law, with the United States as a persistent objector to the i rst sentence of the 
customary rule in general, and France, the UK and the United States as per-
sistent objectors to the application of the i rst sentence of the rule to the use of 
nuclear weapons. 45 As the scope of the prohibition to use methods and means 
of warfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment was discussed above, Rule 45 will not be further discussed here. 
 1.  Rule 43C: the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to 
the environment 
 h e prohibition on launching an attack against a military objective that may be 
expected to cause incidental damage to the environment that would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (or, 
in short: the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment) 
is a relatively new manifestation of the principle of proportionality. h e prin-
ciple of proportionality is a fundamental principle of the law of armed con-
l ict – despite not being referred to by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion – and a ‘general principle on the conduct of hostilities’ (chapeau Rule 
43). h e prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment appears 
to complement the Treaty and customary prohibitions on excessive collateral 
damage to civilians and civilian objects as laid down in Article 51(4) and (5)(b) 
of 1977 Additional Protocol I, and Rule 14 of the ICRC’s CIHL Study. Rule 14 
provides (under the heading ‘Proportionality in Attack’) that:
 Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
 45  Ibid ., pp. 151–5. h e ICRC’s conclusion has not been generally accepted, however. In 1996 
the ICJ rejected the claim that both provisions had customary equivalents (Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, para. 31). In 2006 the drat ers of the  Manual on the Law of Non-International 
Armed Conl ict concluded that Arts. 35(3) and 55 had not developed into rules of customary 
international law:  M. N.  Schmitt ,  C. H. B.  Garraway and  Y.  Dinstein ,  h e Manual on the Law 
of Non-International Armed Conl ict ( San Remo :  International Institute of Humanitarian 
Law ,  2006) , p.  59 . See similarly Y. Dinstein,  h e Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conl ict (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 205; Schmitt, ‘Green 
War’, 76. Hulme is doubtful as to their customary status:  K.  Hulme , ‘Natural Environment’ in 
 E.  Wilmshurst and  S.  Breau (eds.),  Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law ( Cambridge University Press ,  2007) , p.  232 . For further references and 
discussion, see Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 220–4, 235–42. 
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thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
 military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. 
 h e customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environ-
ment arguably emerged during the 1990s, triggered by damage to the environ-
ment caused by Iraq during the 1990–91 Gulf War. 46 Arguably the familiarity 
of states, and in particular their (military) legal advisers, with customary and 
conventional rules governing the protection of civilian objects under IHL, in 
combination with a growing concern for the environment, in particular at er 
1991, triggered the emergence of a specii c customary prohibition on excessive 
collateral damage to the environment. 
 h e existence of the customary prohibition is generally accepted in prac-
tice, 47 as is evident from a variety of sources, including treaties and other 
instruments, national practice, practice of international organisations and 
conferences, practice of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and 
the practice of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 48 In 
relation to Rule 43C, the ICRC refers, among other things, to the 1993 ICRC 
Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the 
Environment in Times of Armed Conl ict 49 and the 1994 San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conl icts at Sea, 50 both of which indi-
cate general acceptance of the prohibition. 51 
 Further, the ICRC refers to the (implicit) acceptance of the rule by the ICJ 
and the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. h e Committee stated that ‘mili-
tary objectives should not be targeted if the attack is likely to cause collateral 
 46  See also  W. Heintschel  von Heinegg and  M.  Donner , ‘ New developments in the protection 
of the natural environment in naval armed conl icts’ ,  German Yearbook of International Law 
 37 ( 1994 ),  281–314 , at 294;  J.-M.  Henckaerts , ‘ Towards better protection for the environ-
ment in armed conl ict: recent developments in international humanitarian law’ ,  Review 
of European Community and International Environmental Law  9 ( 2000 ),  13–19 , at  18 ;  L. 
 Lijnzaad and  G. J.  Tanja , ‘ Protection of the environment in times of armed conl ict: the 
Iraq-Kuwait War ’,  Netherlands International Law Review  40 ( 1993 ),  169–99 , at 184. 
 47  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, 
pp. 145–6. See also Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 261–8 for similar or additional 
evidence. 
 48  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. II: 
Practice, Part 1, pp. 844–59. Please note that the practice relied on by the ICRC relates to 
Rule 43 as a whole. 
 49  ICRC Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the 
Environment in Times of Armed Conl ict (A/48/269, Report of the Secretary-General to 
the General Assembly on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conl ict, 
of 29 July 1993, Annexing the ICRC Guidelines), Principle 4. See also the 1999 ICRC Model 
Manual, para. 702(e) and (f). 
 50  San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conl icts at Sea, paras. 46(d) 
and 13(c). 
 51  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, p. 145. 
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environmental damage which would be excessive in relation to the direct mili-
tary advantage which the attack is expected to produce’. 52 As noted above, in its 
Advisory Opinion the ICJ ai  rmed that: ‘States must take environmental con-
siderations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in 
the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.’ 53 
 Additionally, the rule appears to be evidenced (without reference to the 
‘triple damage standard’) by its rel ection in military manuals, such as the US 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 54 as well as by a 
number of public statements by states within the framework of international 
organisations. Canada, for example, declared in 1992 to the Sixth Committee 
of the UN General Assembly:
 An important evolution was thus taking place which rel ected the import-
ance of the ecological point of view and which should be brought to bear on 
other questions, such as that of proportionality (the need to strike a balance 
between the protection of the environment and the needs of war) or that 
of the distinction between military and non-military objectives. Under the 
same principle, the environment as such should not be the object of direct 
attack, and this delegation would like to see that point rel ected in the reso-
lution to be adopted at er discussion of the item. 55 
 Finally, emergence of a customary international law prohibition on excessive 
collateral damage to the environment appears implicit in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the ICC Statute, which qualii es as a war crime:
 Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment 
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct over-
all military advantage anticipated. 
 Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which rel ects Article 51(4) and (5)(b) of 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, is clearly inspired by Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol. It appears 
to correlate the protection of civilian objects with protection of the environ-
ment as laid down in the Protocol. 56 Although Article 8(2)(b)(iv) provides for 
individual criminal responsibility for intentionally launching an attack which 
 52  ICTY, ‘Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, paras. 15 and 18. 
 53  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 30. 
 54  NWP 1-14M, h e Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, para. 8.4. 
 55  A/C.6/47/SR.8, Summary Record of the 8th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly on 1 October 1992, para. 20. For further references, see Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear 
Weapons , pp. 264–8. 
 56  h e distinction between civilian objects and the natural environment in Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the ICC Statute may be interpreted as an indication that the environment does not qualify 
as a civilian object but as an object  sui generis . 
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causes excessive collateral damage to the environment, and which must also be 
widespread, long-term and severe, arguably the provision implies the existence 
of an independent and ‘primary’ rule of the law of armed conl ict from which 
the war crime is derived. As such, this primary rule – as expressed in Rule 
43C – partly underlies Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 
 For states parties to 1977 Additional Protocol I, this customary prohibition 
on excessive collateral damage to the environment complements Articles 35(3) 
and 55 of the Protocol. 57 In addition to an absolute prohibition to cause wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, states parties to the 
Protocol are also prohibited from causing excessive collateral damage to the 
environment during armed conl ict. Since the two obligations are of dif erent 
scope, it must be established which prevails, or rather which must be applied 
i rst. It is submitted that any military action that causes damage to the environ-
ment must i rst be assessed against this customary prohibition and only then, 
if no breach is established, against Articles 35(3) and 55 of the Protocol. h e 
customary prohibition emerged later in time and provides relative protection 
to the environment (contrary to absolute protection of the environment under 
Articles 35(3) and 55). As such, it appears that the protection af orded by the 
law is signii cantly enhanced by the emergence of a customary prohibition on 
causing excessive collateral damage to the environment. 
 h e relevance of the prohibition in the case of use of a nuclear weapon will 
depend on the circumstances of the case. As above, the damage resulting from 
nuclear explosions will generally be signii cant and foreseeably so. However, 
the extent to which any damage to the environment qualii es as ‘excessive’ will 
depend on the actual military advantage anticipated, as is apparent from the 
text of Rule 43C. If a military object qualii es as a highly valuable military tar-
get, then its destruction may justify considerable collateral damage. In contrast, 
 57  h e customary prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environment must be 
distinguished from the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to civilian objects as 
provided under Art. 51(4) and (5)(b). Although it is arguable that the environment gen-
erally qualii es as a civilian object (see, for example,  M.  Bothe ,  C.  Bruch ,  J.  Diamond and 
 D.  Jensen ,  ‘International law protecting the environment during armed conl ict: gaps and 
opportunities’ ,  International Review of the Red Cross  92 ( 2010 ),  569–92 , at 576), this author 
believes that the environment does not benei t from the same protection provided to civil-
ian objects under conventional law, in particular Arts. 51 and 52. h ere is no indication 
that the drat ers regarded the environment as a civilian object or that they considered the 
environment as being generally protected under Arts. 51 and 52 or their pre-existing cus-
tomary equivalents. Arts. 35(3) and 55 qualify as stand-alone provisions, providing for spe-
cii c protection of the environment, irrespective of their relationship with Arts. 51 and 52, 
and even though, in hindsight, Arts. 51 and 52 and their customary equivalents would 
have provided a more ef ective basis for protecting the environment during armed conl ict. 
For more detail of the argument, see Koppe, ‘h e principle of ambituity’, 68–75; and von 
Heinegg and Donner, ‘New developments in the protection of the natural environment in 
naval armed conl icts’, 289. 
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if a military object is not very valuable for military purposes and is not very 
important for the war ef ort, its destruction would not seem to justify consider-
able collateral damage. h e prohibition on excessive collateral damage always 
entails a balancing of factors, and application of this test therefore depends on 
the circumstances of the case. 
 2.  Rule 44: the customary duty of care for the environment during 
armed conl ict 
 A customary obligation to employ means and methods of warfare with due 
regard to the protection and preservation of the environment (Rule 44, i rst 
sentence) 58 appears to imply the existence of a general duty of care for the envir-
onment during armed conl ict. 59 At er all, ‘due regard’ is merely a standard to 
be applied, similar to the obligation to show ‘due diligence’, which must be 
applied to prevent transboundary environmental harm, 60 and which appears to 
be related to the general obligation on each state ‘not to allow knowingly its ter-
ritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’. 61 h is obligation, 
also known under the maxim  sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas , is arguably 
based on a general duty of care similar to the one binding private individuals 
and legal persons, as recognised in the civil law of tort. 62 
 According to the ICRC, Rule 44 follows from ‘recognition of the need to 
provide particular protection to the environment as such’. 63 Rule 44 therefore 
qualii es as ecocentric, similar to Article 35(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I. It 
rel ects general concern for the environment during armed conl ict dating back 
to 1972, as discussed above, and that is expressed most explicitly in UN General 
 58  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, Rule 
44, pp. 147–51. h e customary basis of Rule 44 has been criticised by Aldrich and to a lesser 
extent by Hulme.  G. H.  Aldrich , ‘ Customary international humanitarian law – an inter-
pretation on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross ’,  British Yearbook of 
International Law  76 ( 2005 ),  503–24 , at 515;  K.  Hulme , ‘ Taking care to protect the environ-
ment against damage: a meaningless obligation? ’,  International Review of the Red Cross  92 
( 2010 ),  675–91 , at 686. 
 59  See, Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 248–56. 
 60  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 29; ICJ,  Gab č í kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia) , Judgment, 25 September 1997 ( Gab č í kovo-Nagymaros case), para. 53. ICJ,  Case 
Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.  Uruguay) , Judgment, 20 April 
2010 ( Pulp Mills case), paras. 204–05. 
 61  ICJ,  Corfu Channel Case , Judgment, 9 April 1949,  ICJ Reports 1949 ( Corfu Channel case), 
p. 22. 
 62  See  M. A.  Fitzmaurice , ‘h e Corfu Channel Case and the development of international 
law’ in  N.  Ando  et al . (eds.),  Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda ( h e Hague:  Kluwer Law 
International ,  2002) , pp.  132 , 137–9. Fitzmaurice relies, among other things, on the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Azevedo in this regard (Dissenting Opinion Judge Azevedo, pp. 84–5). 
 63  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, Rule 
44, p. 147. 
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Assembly Resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992 64 and the General Assembly’s 
decision to declare 6 November the ‘International Day for Preventing the 
Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conl ict’. 65 
 h e emergence of a duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict 
was identii ed by the ICRC from a variety of sources, which include treaties and 
other international instruments and state practice, notably as set out in mili-
tary manuals and in statements within international organisations and confer-
ences. 66 For example, several military manuals provide that military operations 
must be carried out with due regard to the protection of the environment, such 
as the US Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 67 
 Further, a number of states have ai  rmed (or at least implied) the exist-
ence of a duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict. In 1991, for 
example, Canada issued a memorandum that implied the existence of such a 
duty of care; 68 and in 1995 and 1996 a number of states expressed concern for 
the environment during armed conl ict and a need to show due regard before 
the ICJ within the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 69 
Although the Court did not acknowledge the existence of a duty of care for the 
 64  h e General Assembly ‘expressed its deep concern about environmental damage and deple-
tion of natural resources, including the destruction of hundreds of oil-well heads and the 
release and waste of crude oil into the sea, during recent conl icts’ (Resolution 47/37, pre-
ambular para. 3). 
 65  Resolution 56/4 of 5 November 2001. h e date of 6 November 2001 marked the tenth anni-
versary of the extinguishing of the last oil-well i re in Kuwait. W. J. Hybl, Representative of 
the United States, in Press Release GA/9946 of 5 November 2001, available at:  www.unis.
unvienna.org/ . 
 66  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. II: 
Practice, Part 1, pp. 860–71. See also Koppe,  h e Use of Nuclear Weapons , pp. 248–56, for 
similar or additional evidence. 
 67  NWP 1–14M, h e Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Department 
of the Navy, Newport, RI, 2007, para. 8–4. See also the San Remo Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Armed Conl icts at Sea, in  International Review of the Red Cross 309 
(1995), paras. 44, 11, 46(c), and 13(c); and the ICRC Model Military Manual.  A. P. V.  Rogers 
and  P.  Malherbe ,  Fight it Right: Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conl ict for Armed 
Forces (Geneva :  ICRC ,  1999) , para. 702(c). 
 68  h e Memorandum stated that ‘[t]he customary laws of war, in rel ecting the dictates of 
public conscience, now include a requirement to avoid unnecessary damage to the envir-
onment. h is includes consideration of environmental ef ects in the planning of military 
operations.’ Canadian Department of External Af airs, Legal Bureau, ‘Memorandum; 12 
July 1991; Armed Conl ict and the Environment’, in  B.  Mawhinney (ed.), ‘ Canadian practice 
in international law: at the Department of External Af airs in 1991–92’ ,  Canadian Yearbook 
of International Law  30 ( 1992 ),  347–64 . See similarly Summary Record of the 18th meeting 
of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 22 October 1991, UN doc. A/C.6/46/
SR.18, para. 13; Summary Record of the 8th meeting of the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly on 1 October 1992, UN doc. A/C.6/47/SR.8, para. 20. 
 69  Sri Lanka, for example, referred to the protection of the environment during armed con-
l ict as an established principle of international law. Written Statement of the Government 
of Sri Lanka, 20 September 1994, in ICJ,  Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons 
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environment during armed conl ict as such, it did observe that environmental 
factors and considerations must play an important role in the implementation 
of the law of armed conl ict, 70 which suggests the existence of an obligation to 
show due regard for the environment during armed conl ict. Finally, a duty of 
care for the environment is arguably evidenced by the i rst sentence of Article 
55(1) of 1977 Additional Protocol I, which provides: ‘Care shall be taken in 
warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and 
severe damage.’ 71 
 A duty of care for the environment or an obligation to use methods and 
means of warfare with due regard for the environment during armed conl ict 
entails that states must take ‘all feasible precautions’ in the conduct of mili-
tary operations ‘to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental damage 
to the environment’ 72 (Rule 44, second sentence). 73 h e second sentence of 
Rule 44 ‘operationalises’ the more general obligation in the i rst sentence and 
appears to rel ect the general principle of prevention, which qualii es as a prin-
ciple of international environmental law. 74 h e requirement to take all feasible 
in Armed Conl ict , 8 July 1996 (hereat er, WHO Advisory Opinion Request), p. 3. Iran, 
Sweden and New Zealand each expressed a concern for the environment during armed 
conl ict. Written Statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, p. 4; Written Statement of Sweden, WHO Advisory Opinion Request, p. 5; Written 
Statement of New Zealand, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, pp. 17–18. For further 
and other examples of national practice that also indicate a concern for the environment, 
see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. II: 
Practice, Part 1, pp. 862–7. 
 70  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, paras. 30, 32 and 33. 
 71  According to Hulme, Rule 44 of the ICRC’s CIHL Study requiring states to show due regard 
for the environment is not the same as the obligation to take care of the environment as 
laid down in Article 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. Hulme, ‘Taking care to protect the 
environment against damage’, pp. 679–80, 685–6, 691. Compare, however, Hulme’s previ-
ous discussions of the relationship between Art. 55(1) and Rule 44.  K.  Hulme ,  War Torn 
Environment: Interpreting the Legal h reshold ( Leiden :  Martinus Nijhof  ,  2004) , p.  108 ; 
Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’, p. 218. 
 72  Rule 44 does not refer to incidental damage to the environment that is excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, as Rule 43C does. 
 73  h e second sentence of Rule 44 is similar to Rule 15 (which rel ects Art. 57(1) of 1977 
Additional Protocol I), which states: ‘In the conduct of military operations, constant care 
must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible 
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.’ Rule 15 is further detailed in Rules 
16–21. 
 74  h e principle of prevention was recognised by the ICJ in the 2010  Pulp Mills case (para. 
101). See also Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. Pursuant to the principle of preven-
tion, states must at least carry out an environmental impact assessment prior to authorising 
a project that may have signii cant transboundary consequences and during the implemen-
tation of a project.  Pulp Mills case, paras. 204–5. See also Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration. 
h e principle of prevention is further rel ected in the 2001 ILC Articles on Transboundary 
Pollution (UN doc. A/56/10, Drat  Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
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precautions ‘objectii es’ the behaviour of belligerents and requires that bellig-
erents act reasonably or in conformity with what could be reasonably expected 
from that state under the specii c circumstances. As such, an assessment must 
be made of all environmental risks. 75 
 While the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise 
damage to the environment appears to require foreseeability of environmental 
damage, Rule 44 further states that ‘[l]ack of scientii c certainty as to the ef ects 
on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to 
the conl ict from taking such precautions’. As such, the third sentence of Rule 
44 goes further than the other rules of the law of armed conl ict that protect the 
environment and that were discussed above. It rel ects the precautionary prin-
ciple, 76 which arguably qualii es as a principle of international environmental 
law, 77 and which is essential in view of the dii  culty of analysing natural proc-
esses and assessing environmental damage. 
 Similar to the prohibition on excessive collateral damage to the environ-
ment, this customary duty of care for the environment complements Articles 
35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. For states parties to the Protocol, 
and for the same reasons as mentioned above in relation to the prohibition on 
excessive collateral damage to the environment, any military operation or use 
Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, 2001). h e Articles on Transboundary Pollution 
provide, in short, that the state of origin must take all appropriate measures to prevent sig-
nii cant transboundary harm or minimise the risk thereof. For that purpose, states must 
under certain circumstances carry out a proper environmental impact assessment. 
 75  Compare Rule 18, which requires states to ‘do everything feasible to assess whether the 
attack may be expected to cause’ excessive collateral damage to the civilian population or 
civilian objects. 
 76  See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck,  Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. I, 
Rule 44, p. 150. 
 77  See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which refers to a precautionary approach in case 
of scientii c uncertainty. h e formulation of Rule 44’s second and third sentence indicates 
that the precautionary approach is part of the obligation to take all feasible precautions to 
avoid or at least minimise incidental environmental damage. A similar approach was taken 
by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its 
Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area of 1 February 2011. h e Chamber held that 
‘it is appropriate to point out that the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States, which is applicable even outside 
the scope of the Regulations. h e due diligence obligation of the sponsoring States requires 
them to take all appropriate measures to prevent damage that might result from the activ-
ities of contractors that they sponsor. h is obligation applies in situations where scientii c 
evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the activity in question is 
insui  cient but where there are plausible indications of potential risks. A sponsoring State 
would not meet its obligation of due diligence if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard 
would amount to a failure to comply with the precautionary approach’ (para. 131). See also 
Separate Opinion of Judge Can ç ado Trindade,  Pulp Mills case, paras. 52–3, 62–92. 
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of methods or means of warfare must i rst be assessed against the customary 
duty of care for the environment. Only if no breach can be established is it 
necessary to assess such operations against Articles 35(3) and 55. 
 Rule 44 or the duty of care for the environment is not weapon-specii c 
and could arguably also extend to the use of nuclear weapons. h erefore, if 
applied to a hypothetical use of nuclear weapons, the relevance of a custom-
ary duty of care for the environment during armed conl ict may be signii cant. 
In particular, the extent to which the nuclear weapon state has taken all feas-
ible precautions to avoid, or in any event to minimise, collateral damage to 
the environment must be established. It is arguable that nuclear weapon states 
must assess the potential environmental harm of the use of nuclear weapons 
and if necessary call of  an attack to avoid or at least minimise collateral envir-
onmental harm. 78 Such assessment would need to include a thorough investi-
gation of the possibility of using alternative weapon systems. Nowadays, most 
nuclear weapon states possess highly sophisticated and powerful weapons that 
can hit targets over long distances with a high degree of accuracy, which means 
that use of nuclear weapons may not be necessary to destroy a military object-
ive. Since there is no lack of scientii c certainty as to the ef ects on the environ-
ment of the use of nuclear weapons, there is no need to discuss the obligation 
to take precautionary measures in conformity with Article 44C third sentence. 
 Conclusion 
 Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever invented. h e con-
sequences of a single nuclear explosion will likely be devastating, not only for 
man, but also for the environment. h is chapter has sought to clarify the scope 
of the relevant rules of the law of armed conl ict and to assess,  in abstracto , the 
legality of use of nuclear weapons under these rules. 
 Articles 35(3) and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol I both prohibit the use 
of methods and means of warfare that are intended or that may be expected 
to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment. h is 
author has sought to argue that both rules must be taken into account by 
nuclear weapon states that have become party to 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
including France and the UK. In light of the ef ects of a nuclear explosion, in 
particular the ef ects of ionising or nuclear radiation, it is likely that the use of 
a nuclear weapon during armed conl ict will cause widespread, long-term and 
 78  Hulme, ‘Taking care to protect the environment against damage’, pp. 681–2. See also the 
illustrative list drawn up by Droege and Tsougas of measures that can be taken to show due 
regard for the environment:  C.  Droege and  M.-L.  Tsougas , ‘ h e protection of the natural 
environment in armed conl ict – existing rules and need for further legal protection’ ,  Nordic 
Journal of International Law  82 ( 2013 ),  21–52 , at 33–5. 
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severe damage to the environment and will therefore be contrary to Articles 
35(3) and 55, to the extent that these provisions are applicable. 
 h is author has also argued that under customary international law, Rules 
43C of the ICRC’s CIHL Study (the prohibition on causing excessive collateral 
damage to the environment) and 44 (the general duty of care for the environ-
ment during armed conl ict) must also be taken into account by all nuclear 
weapon states. Since both rules provide relative protection to the environment 
(contrary to the absolute protection of the environment under Articles 35(3) 
and 55) and since both rules emerged later in time, to the extent the rules are 
applicable any use of nuclear weapons must i rst be assessed against these cus-
tomary rules. Only if no breach of these rules can be established, must the 
legality of that particular use be assessed – if applicable – against Articles 35(3) 
and 55. 
 Rule 43C, which prohibits excessive collateral damage to the environment, 
requires a balancing of values, namely expected environmental damage and the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. h e question of the extent 
to which the use of a nuclear weapon would be in conformity with this rule 
will therefore depend entirely on the circumstances of the case. Rule 44 pre-
scribes that states must take all feasible precautions to avoid and in any event 
to minimise incidental damage to the environment. It is arguable that Rule 44 
requires states to assess in advance the potential environmental harm of a par-
ticular method or means of warfare, including use of a nuclear weapon, and 
to assess to what extent the target can be neutralised by an alternative weapon 
system. Whether any use of a nuclear weapon is in conformity with this rule 
will therefore depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular ef orts by 
the nuclear weapon state prior to its decision to employ nuclear weapons and 
the reasonableness of its decision. 
 h is chapter shows that the rules of the law of armed conl ict that protect the 
environment during armed conl ict may provide additional parameters and 
signii cant impediments for a nuclear weapon state to employ nuclear weap-
ons. h ese parameters have materialised over the last twenty to thirty years 
and rel ect growing concern for environmental protection. Such protection 
is not only in the interest of all states, but also in the interest of mankind. 79 
At er all, ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, 
the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn.’ 80 
 
 
 79  Gab č í kovo-Nagymaros case, para. 53: ‘h e Court recalls that it has recently had occasion to 
stress … the great signii cance that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for 
States but also for the whole of mankind.’ 
 80  Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 29. 
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